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  Bernard Wills & Jason Holt 
Abstract
Is it wrong to enjoy art created by immoral people? Some people express
discomfort with listening to or reading the works of artists who have been
abusive to others in their personal lives. In this paper, the authors argue
that, generally speaking, moral and aesthetic judgment should be kept
distinct, as authors and their works formally differ. Indeed, works by
morally dubious artists may well contain crucial acts of moral imagination
we should not deprive ourselves of as ethical beings. Nonetheless, the
authors argue there are limits to how far the ethical and aesthetic can be
divorced. Art that is completely divorced from the good ceases thereby
to be art no matter what its formal beauty. Thus, it is possible, in
principle, to identify works of art whose authorship would be an obstacle
to aesthetic appreciation.
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1. Introduction
One of the pleasures of social media is finding oneself debating
complete strangers on fundamental questions of philosophy. One of the
present authors’ encounters in the agora of the internet concerned the
question of morality and art. It is well known that many first-rate artists
are also first-rate jerks.[1] Some seem to believe that this must be an
illusion. Whatever appears to be the case, it must be that these artists
are, in fact, overrated. Thus we have those who argue that Wagner, say,
was not such a great composer after all. We, however, have ears and
can tell that the moral stature of the man hardly registers on the scale of
so monumental an achievement as the Ring, even if some of what
bothers us about the man can be read into certain parts of that particular
Gesamtkunstwerk. We will proceed from the assumption that this is a
real issue, that great, inspiring art can come from perfectly horrid people.
Some people, such as DJ NDN of the hip-hop/dance/electronica group A
Tribe Called Red, are bothered by this. In a recent CBC article that
sparked the interesting little online debate mentioned above, he informs
us that he has stopped playing publicly or listening privately to a host of
artists, including David Bowie, Led Zeppelin, James Brown, Afrika
Bambaattaa, and Chris Brown.[2] The reason he gives is that these
artists have behaved or are suspected of behaving abusively towards
minors and/or women. As a man with young daughters, he is rightly
bothered by this: “There's all these people who have done harm....
Everybody seems okay with that as long as they make good music.” In
this paper we will defend just this proposition. Note that we are not okay
with bad behavior. We are however okay with enjoying the artistic
creations of people who behave badly, within certain limits that will be
discussed below.
This is not an obvious or easy question to answer. Indeed, there are, in
fact, a number of distinct questions at play here, as there are at least
five different kinds of artist in question. There are artists who, on the
balance, seem to have been admirable people, and others, like Homer,
whose moral sensibilities are often remote from ours by reason of their
great antiquity. We obviously deprecate the piratical tendencies of
Odysseus but it is far from clear that Homer does. Chaucer's Prioress'
Tale may be abhorrent to us but that Jews were child killers was, as far
as his audience was concerned, often believed.[3] Secondly, there are
artists, like Tolstoy or Dickens, who managed to be flawed people in
spite of the fact that their authorial voices are humane and indeed a
crucial source of moral insight for their readers. Thirdly, there are morally
ambivalent artists, like Wagner or Céline, people whose art seems
unquestionably important but who also embody cultural and political
values that are dubious, in the first case, and downright cracked in the
second. Fourthly, there are artists, like Eric Gill and Caravaggio, whose
works are of undeniable merit but who are reprehensible as people.
Finally, there are artists, like Sade and Genet, who revel in depictions of
criminality and bestial behavior. Like the first group, they lived or are
reputed to have lived just as they wrote or painted or composed.
The first group is not problematic, obviously. We take the last group to
also be unproblematic. People who live their art are inviting judgments
on their character and their art together, as they make no separation
between the two. That Sade actually attempted the sadistic deeds
described at such length in Justine and 120 Days of Sodom kills his
books for many people, for they then become not fantasy but an implicit
apology for his own brutishness. Consequently, many readers steer
clear of them.[4]
Before proceeding further, though, it will help to draw certain relevant
distinctions. First, as a matter of principle, works and their creators are
normally distinct entities. A moral flaw in one need not, by itself, imply a
corresponding flaw in the other, and naively supposing otherwise is to
commit either the guilt-by-association or the genetic fallacy.[5] The
legitimacy of supposing some connection between the moral status of a
work and that of its progenitor will depend on such criteria as the
potential explanatory value of such a connection. An artist’s character
flaws and strengths will often reveal themselves strikingly or subtly in art.
Secondly, we should be clear to distinguish the moral status of a work
from the moral status of its content. Presenting content that is morally
good, bad, or indifferent is, by itself, irrelevant to the moral status of the
work as a whole. Everything here depends on how such content is
framed by the artist and, correspondingly, the attitude suggested by the
work. Thirdly, and a related issue, is being clear about the difference
between one’s actual reactions to works and artists, or descriptive
matters, and those that one should or should not and may or may not
have, or normative issues. Some of our reactions may be obligatory or
permissible but others may not be either. One need not justify failing to
read Genet, as subjective preferences suffice here, but we might
question whether avoiding him altogether out of moral compunction is
fair. After all, some have found a great freeing of the mind in reading his
work. Likewise, fourth, we should clearly distinguish moral from aesthetic
standards. Even if we are right to believe that ethics trumps aesthetics,
often, if not always, our verdict on a work need not be univocal. There is
nothing inherently wrong in having divided moral and aesthetic verdicts
on a work of art, just as with people or anything else.
2. Character flaws and propaganda
To return to the point above, it is the middle cases that interest us, and it
is these that we will treat.[6] First off, let us say that we are not
unsympathetic to DJ NDN and others who have taken the same position.
Indeed, we would be hypocritical if we were. Ages ago, one of us, too,
renounced listening to a favorite musician out of religious scruples. More
recently, the other of us has found his appreciation of a certain filmmaker
to have ebbed significantly given unsavory revelations about the
director’s life, not as a conscious moral decision but rather because
many of those films now inevitably appear in a somewhat different light.
Yet DJ NDN and we are open to some telling objections.
The first and most obvious one is that good artists who are good people
and have only sound opinions about the world are vanishingly rare. What
art would we be able to enjoy under such moral hygiene? Indeed, where
do we draw the line? DJ NDN mentions artists who have sexually
abused minors or physically abused women, but why restrict our
judgment to these forms of criminality? Villon was a thief and inveterate
rogue. Nina Simone was a physically and verbally abusive parent. What
about Dostoevsky's addiction to gambling? What about hard drugs? Are
tax cheats, like Willie Nelson, off limits? What about artists we enjoy but
whose biographies we have not yet read? Are we obligated to
investigate their lives for potential crimes against women and children?
Secondly, this principle seems to ignore moral luck. Blues, jazz, and hip-
hop are fundamental artistic forms in which African Americans have
expressed themselves. Yet they are products of an oppressed people
with many of the social and personal pathologies that often attend that
oppression. Bourgeois liberal morality, admirable or not, may well be a
luxury people from the underclass can ill afford, and the lives of many
jazz and blues giants surely reflect this pressure. One of the complicating
aspects of this debate is that the artistic forms most often brought up for
censure, such as hip-hop, are forms created by and for the oppressed
and disadvantaged. This surely complicates the profile of moral
complaint.
At any rate, people are often inconsistent in these judgments. Why, for
instance, do many people who disdain the films of Riefenstahl admire
those of Eisenstein when both filmmakers performed comparable
services for their respective tyrants? Of course, these cases are rather
complex. In the Riefenstahl case, it is extremely difficult to watch
Triumph of the Will, which documents the Nazi rallies at Nuremberg,
celebrating the key figures and highlighting the speeches of the Nazi
elite, despite the awesomeness of the spectacle and the aesthetic quality
and power of the film.[7] The morally abhorrent content and
circumstances of this “docuganda” simply cannot be ignored, either as a
matter of fact or as a matter of conscience.
However, things are rather different when it comes to Riefenstahl’s
Olympia, a double-feature-length documentary of the 1936 Berlin
Olympics. Olympia was also commissioned by the Nazis and contains
significant though subtler strains of Nazi propaganda, with an
unsurprising focus on the achievements of “beswastikaed” German
athletes and victories. In the pistol shooting sequence, for instance, most
competitors are shot from similar normal angles, whereas a Nazi shooter
is shot from a closer, much lower angle, creating a more imposing
impression that accentuates the size and threat of the Nazi figure.
Olympia, however, is comparatively easy to watch, and this need not
imply a moral flaw in the observer, as would likely be the case if one
reveled in Triumph while ignoring the relevant moral issues. This is, in
part, because the propaganda is subtler, the real world more intrusive.
Olympia might well have been intended to celebrate the Führer
overseeing a showcase of Nazi superiority, but how moving, how
profound, how sublime it is to see those historic gold medal
performances by Jesse Owens through Riefenstahl’s lens under Hitler’s
gaze! Clearly a work of art can become more compelling if it, even
unconsciously, questions or subverts its own stated aims![8]
Still, we do not think these points are entirely decisive. This is because,
in spite of all we have said above, there seems to be something sound
about the intuition that the beautiful is related in some way to the good.
A beautifully shaped sonnet that described in loving detail the torture and
murder of a child would not win our admiration no matter how exquisite.
Berys Gaut describes such ethicism as the view that “the ethical
assessment of attitudes manifested by works of art is a legitimate aspect
of the aesthetic evaluation of those works….”[9] Similarly, perhaps, the
discovery that a fine painting was actually produced by a Hannibal
Lecter or an Adolf Hitler would diminish it in our eyes, especially as we
would be keenly motivated to scrutinize the work for symptoms of their
psychopathologies.[10]
Clearly, the freedom of artistic creation from moral boundaries has its
limits, however hard it may be to say just where those limits lie. We can
all see that Lars von Trier’s Nymphomaniac is one thing and the run of
the mill products of the porn industry are another. Again, we may judge
with a kind of dispassion that Triumph of the Will is a great artistic
achievement but there would be something seriously wrong if, with our
knowledge of history, we were able to watch the film and not have our
aesthetic appreciation for its artistry clouded or compromised by an
aversion to Nazi ideology.[11] With this in mind, then, we will try to be
true to two intuitions that both seem to us sufficiently firm if not
absolutely solid: that aesthetic judgment is independent of moral
judgment, and that this independence is not absolute but can
legitimately be challenged in some instances.
3. Cultural distance and moral complexity
Let us deal with the categories of artist we mentioned above. The first is
easiest to deal with. If the Hebrew Bible and the Iliad live for us today, it
is not because of the slaughter of the Amalekites or the sacrifice of the
Trojan prisoners to the ghost of Patroclus. To use an old-fashioned term,
these texts live because they are sublime. They create secondary
worlds that are both grandly inspiring and intimately human. Across the
centuries we find our most fundamental questions about ourselves
confronted and addressed, in spite of cultural barriers that would seem
insurmountable. Is there any other poem about war as truthful as the
Iliad? Has our yearning for justice ever found purer expression than the
poetry of Amos? That the creators of these works have what we would
now consider moral blind-spots means only that they are human like us.
We should all be humbled by the thought that readers a thousand years
from now may find us bizarre and repellent. On this point we are happy
to cite Shelley’s “A Defence of Poetry”:
Nor let it be objected that these characters [i.e., in Homer] are remote
from moral perfection and that they can by no means be considered as
edifying patterns for general imitation. Every epoch, under names more
or less specious, has deified its peculiar errors... but a poet considers
the vices of his contemporaries as a temporary dress in which his
creations must be arrayed, and which cover without concealing the
eternal proportions of their beauty.[12]
Shelley’s language may seem quaint to the contemporary reader, but
the idea he is driving at here seems to us apt. For Shelley, the aesthetic
beauty of a character, even the moral beauty of a character, consists in
the play of energy bounded by form. It does not exist in an arbitrary
perfectionism. Achilles is thrilling for the authenticity and intensity of his
passion and intellect, even though this may express itself in deeds of
dreadful baseness as much as in acts that are beautiful. This spirit and
energy is his character, which would be ruined for us as much by
excessive goodness as by excessive evil. The free play of both is
essential to the tension that makes for the energy and activity that
manifests beauty. Indeed, essential to any drama is the struggle of
personal character with the moral expectations of one’s time and place.
The “vices and errors” Shelley refers to are essential to the beauty of the
effect. A poet of any age or culture is capable of beauty in this sense,
and that is why we can appreciate Beowulf as much as we can Brodsky.
Shelley points us in a direction that allows us to see the goodness or
beauty of a poetic creation in terms not reducible to moral rectitude as
this or that time or culture conceives it.
On one level such attitudes may seem prejudicial, but that is not
especially problematic if we concern ourselves with our own individual
tastes and the obvious fact that attention and time have limits. There is
only so much art we can devote time and attention to, and there is
nothing wrong with making such choices in terms of preferences that are
themselves arbitrary at base. One’s love of film noir licenses and
explains watching with great interest and deep satisfaction quite
mediocre examples of the genre, even though one thereby forgoes
watching objectively better films from other genres. Nothing wrong there,
so long as it is clear that one isn’t making an objective claim about the
relative merits of film noir. One may also choose not to engage certain
artworks, again arbitrarily, not on the basis of the works themselves but
because of what one feels or thinks of the artist. Such selection may not
be fair either to the work or to the artist, especially the more persuaded
we are that truly original and insightful art is a particularly scarce
resource. If we never read Hemingway because we have heard he was
some kind of macho chauvinist, we might be not only foregoing a rare
literary pleasure but also mistreating both him and his work, him by
uncritically accepting an unfair gloss on his character, and his work
because of its aesthetic power and nuanced treatment of such issues as
caricature Hemingway is entirely unaware. The Sun Also Rises alone
kills the caricature.
At any rate, few works of art, ancient or modern, are lessened by the
moral complexity and ambiguity of their characters but usually
immeasurably enhanced. There are specific works like folk tales,
parables, and fables, of course, that depend on simplicity for their effect
but, in general, subtle delineation of the shades of human character is
valued by readers and critics. However, can this effect be ruined by the
personal life of an artist? Are there artists so objectionable as people
that we cannot enjoy and indeed should not enjoy their art? As a matter
of principle rather than preference, only in extreme cases.
An artist as a human may be callous, lecherous, vain, spiteful, or
otherwise. Nothing of this is surprising, as we can all identify some or
something of these traits in ourselves, not as outright evils but as the
ordinary imperfections of life. That Keats was a nicer man than Tolstoy,
and Tolstoy a nicer man than Dickens, reflects the ordinary range of
human personality in which artists do not differ much, if at all, from most
other people. This is why we accept, say, that Tolstoy's moral
imagination, so powerfully expressed in his art, was not always so
powerfully expressed in his daily life. The artist is not the person. The
mind at play in the work is greater and freer than the mind of the
empirical individual. It is at work in creating a moral landscape for
characters to inhabit but this function is different, as Shelley says, from
the capacity to make abstract distinctions about the good and from the
will to enact them. It is entirely possible that the hypertrophic
development of the first capacity may hinder the growth and
development of the second, so that every great artist pays a price as a
human being. Nonetheless, we think Shelley is probably right to
emphasize that moral imagination, that is, the capacity to imagine
significant moral conflicts and embody them in situations, is essential to
the development of morality as a necessary but, alas, not sufficient
condition. Such an imaginative capacity is one thing, a vital thing, but the
will to act morally is another. The first has its own necessity and integrity,
its own freedom that the moralist must respect.
4. How immoral? How intrusive?
Nonetheless, this distinction can be sorely tested. We think this is the
case when an artist's vices are not ordinary vices of passion but have a
cold calculating aspect. The cool head and icy heart that plans a mass
murder is just what we do not want in an artist.[13] The art of a Hannibal
Lecter could be a triumph of intellect in shaping intricate form, perhaps,
but not of warmth or sympathetic imagination. If a mass murderer or
serial killer were also a fine poet, this total disjunction would itself be a
kind of ugliness or aesthetic imperfection. Art that ceases utterly to be
good thereby ceases to be art. Under this limitation no painting of a
Hitler or a Hannibal Lecter could possess an unspoiled beauty no matter
how seemingly exquisite the brushwork, although short of such extremes
we seem permissibly able to value Eric Gill’s sculpture and typeface.[14]
Here we might agree with Simone Weil's assertion that the songs of the
emperor Nero may have been technically fine but as art could only have
been second rate, a decadent imitation of their betters.[15] Compare this
cold-hearted aestheticism to the wonderful poems of Francois Villon. Is it
not plain that this thief and scoundrel wins our sympathy by being in the
grip of self-destructive passions and mystifying compulsions just as we
ourselves too often are? A great sinner can create great art, while an
inhuman monster cannot.
Finally, what of the Wagners, the Pounds and Célines, those artists who
challenge us by the repugnant nature of their political or social views?
Wagner’s political and social views are a matter of some interpretive
complexity but the latter two were clearly and unambiguously racists.
Moreover, their racism is part and parcel of their work. Indeed, Céline
wrote genocidal tracts in the mid-1930s, when he was under no
apparent compulsion to do so. Again one could make the obvious point
that people show no consistency here. Associations with right-wing
totalitarianism put an artist's work in question but associations with left-
wing totalitarianism do not. Nobody takes Hugh MacDiarmid to be a
lesser artist for writing the First Hymn to Lenin, even though Lenin was a
murderer. Does this reflect anything but the fact that Stalinists were on
our side in World War II while Fascists were not? Perhaps, but perhaps it
also reflects the fact that we can believe ourselves to have been
attracted to Communism out of a noble sympathy for workers or the
poor, whereas we like to think that we could never have been attracted
to Fascism, which is probably untrue, as the current political climate
suggests of surprisingly many people. Either way, the complacency of
our attitude here may well give us pause.
This is only a partial answer, however. Controversy arises because the
Wagners and the Célines obviously have done something very good yet,
potentially, at least, very bad, to say nothing of unambiguous cases like
the crimes of an Eric Gill or a Caravaggio. We suppose this partly
concerns the fact that someone who thinks that Wagner's music is
beautiful might be more kindly disposed to his anti-Semitism than they
would otherwise have been. Frankly, we don't think this happens. There
may be all kinds of reasons why someone becomes a pedophile but
admiring Eric Gill’s sculpture or Nabokov’s fiction is not one of them. We
could be wrong about this, but we strongly suspect that most admirers of
these artists are generally well-educated people who would not be
attracted to the deplorable crimes these artists have committed, as with
Gill, or depicted, as with Nabokov. Conversely, we sincerely doubt that
the average white supremacist would sit through even five minutes of
Parsifal. More problematic, however, is the fact that respect for the
victims of such ideologies seems incompatible with enjoying the art of
their proponents.[16] But one can indeed enjoy Wagner’s musical works
and still dismiss his anti-Semitic views. Anti-Semitism is not expressed
in Wagner’s musical works.
This problem is even more acute in the case of Céline’s novels, for,
unlike Wagner, he was alive during and complicit in the events in
question. Here we must say that we would not blame anybody who
refuses to read novels like Castle to Castle or Rigadoon. However, we
feel compelled to say one thing in their defense. Unlike Riefenstahl’s
films, they are not propaganda; Céline’s mordant wit and nihilistic zest
spare no one, least of all his own side. Nor has anyone else quite so
vividly captured the chaotic insanity of a crumbling Nazi regime. These
admirable aesthetic qualities stay with the reader far longer than the
anti-Semitic jibes and rants about the Yellow Menace peppering his
works. One might ask how Céline could have chronicled the fall of
Germany with such hallucinatory intensity if he had not been, at least
partly, an insider. This is to say that even in very problematic works
there can be a kind of integrity that moves us to proper respect, if not
permissible love. As the theologians used to say, evil is always parasitic
on some good, and if the corruption of Céline’s genius is an issue, it is
because he had a genius to corrupt. Readers and listeners retain the
right to weigh the problematic aspects of these artists and others like
them against the very obvious gains in appreciation and perception they
offer. Someone who ignores Wagner on moral grounds may well be
forgoing crucial insight into the power and nature of myth and the
expressive potential of music. Moreover, Parsifal is a morally good tale,
and Siegfried is an exploration of Romantic morality.
Be that as it may, there may be little danger of adopting an artist’s moral
flaws just because we admire their works but there are other more likely
tendencies against which we should guard, even setting aside
longstanding concerns about art’s potentially corrupting influence.[17]
There is sometimes a tendency to be more forgiving of artists as people
because of their art, to cut them more slack because, despite their
personal failings, on balance they have had a positive influence on the
culture. Roman Polanski might be taken as a textbook case. We might
say this of a Caravaggio, too. To forgive art the artist is one thing, but to
forgive the artist because of the art is another.
A related pernicious tendency is that of unduly diminishing or denying
the importance of the artist’s immoral behavior when we happen to like
their work. Even worse than this, we often cling to an unwarranted
skepticism about allegations against our favorite artists, assuming so
heavy a burden of proof that almost nothing could count as sufficient
evidence of their guilt, despite the principled difference between the
artistic status of the work and the moral status of the person who created
it. Of course, our moral condemnation of an artist and his or her work is
sometimes owing to what is later revealed to be bias if not outright
prejudice. Formerly, much more widespread condemnations of
homosexuality and other practices deemed decadent seemed to fit
naturally with a failure to fully appreciate the work of an Oscar Wilde.
Indeed, in such cases we see the power of art coming to redeem its
artist from the unfortunate condemnation of a culture not yet enlightened
enough to feel that no redemption is necessary. Sometimes appreciation
of a work can open our eyes to moral progress in judging the artist
themselves. Art can save artists from an otherwise undeserved fate.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we think we have established that there are sound
reasons for keeping ethical judgments and aesthetic judgments distinct,
at least in most cases. At the same time, it must be admitted that this
license cannot be absolute. There will remain works, or potential works,
like an undiscovered masterpiece by a Hitler or a Hannibal Lecter, that
we are probably wrong to enjoy. This depends, in the end, on what
aesthetic qualities can be identified that are independent of or work
contrary to the problematic aspects of an artistic vision. If Pound’s poetic
skills were spent entirely on elaborating anti-Semitic sentiments, then it
is difficult to see why he should be read. In such a case, the style would
merely be an ornament for objectionable content, and the work would
fail aesthetically in addition to morally. Yet, as this is far from the case,
each reader has a judgment call to make that cannot be universally
prescriptive. Some may prefer to ignore Pound or other far-right leaning
authors, such as Norway’s Knut Hamsun, but nobody, as far as we can
see, can be obligated to. In this way, we think that a balance has been
struck between our right to freedom as appreciators of art and the
genuine intuition that art that strays too far from the good thereby ceases
to be art.
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Endnotes
Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
[1] By ‘jerk,’ here we mean someone who, in him- or herself, or through
his or her work, tends toward the negative side of the moral spectrum:
ambiguous, flawed, or outright depraved. We will assume agreement on
a common sense understanding of what things will count as artworks.
[2] “A Tribe Called Red's Deejay NDN Takes Racist, Misogynistic Music
off His Playlist,” cbc.ca, last modified May 1, 2016,
http://www.cbc.ca/radio/unreserved/stepping-up-standing-out-and-
making-change-1.3553520/a-tribe-called-red-s-deejay-ndn-takes-racist-
misogynistic-music-off-his-playlist-1.3559459, accessed November 11,
2016. As we shall see below, this is a question that bothers philosophers
as much as pop artists.
[3] Even here Chaucer may be more contemporary than we think, as
more than one reader has found some irony in the fact that the teller of
this bloodthirsty tale is the delicate prioress.
[4] We have read some Genet, though only in translation. His works
have merit but seem flawed in a way similar to William S. Burroughs,
that is, both might have been better writers if they had been better
people. Part of the problem seems to be that in their writing and/or lives
some real flaws, for example, crime, are braided with what society no
longer brands the same way such as homosexuality. Although what we
see as the unevenness of Burroughs’s writing is plausibly attributable to
his drug use, for instance, such apparent connections might be only that,
or it could be that his writing would have been inferior otherwise.
[5] For a rather extreme statement of the absolute divide between
aesthetics and ethics, see William H. Gass, “Goodness Knows Nothing
of Beauty: On the Distance Between Morality and Art,” Harper’s, 274,
1643 (April 1997), 37-44.
[6] Note though that if there can be a connection between moral failures
in life and in art, there might also be a connection between moral
successes in life and in art. What we like about Blake the person, to take
one example, and what we like about Blake the poet might or might not
be connected.
[7] For extensive discussion, see Mary Devereaux, “Beauty and Evil:
The Case of Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will,” in Aesthetics and
Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 227-256.
[8] We suppose one could say that at moments such as these, or the
Odessa steps sequence in Battleship Potemkin, the artist triumphs over
the propagandist so fully as to produce something human and moving
irrespective of politics.
[9] Berys Gaut, “The Ethical Criticism of Art,” in Aesthetics and Ethics:
Essays at the Intersection, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), pp. 182-203; ref. on 182.
[10] We know of course that Lecter is fictional and Hitler lacked the talent
to produce such work, but that is beside the point.
[11] See Jason Holt, “Mumford on Aesthetic–Moral Interaction in Sport,”
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 44, 1 (2017), 72-80; ref. on 76-78.
[12] Percy Bysshe Shelley, “A Defence of Poetry,” in Selected Poetry
and Prose, ed. Harold Bloom (New York: Signet Classical Books, 1966),
p. 425. One way of putting this is that “moral struggle” is more engaging
aesthetically than moral perfection. Struggling towards the good makes a
more satisfactory representation than simply possessing it.
[13] Even so, there does seem to be for artists acceptable variation on
the spectrum between completely passionate inspiration and more
concerted, reflective efforts, between what Nietzsche calls the Dionysian
and the Apollonian in art. We should not denigrate a Bach in the face of
a Beethoven, for instance.
[14] If we were to tease out what lies behind this assertion, we would say
that part of the integrity of a work of art lies in its content, and, in line with
what Arendt tells us of the banality of evil, it seems unlikely that the work
of a sociopath or clinical narcissist would have the degree of insight or
unclouded perception necessary to engage our interest no matter how
much talent that person may possess. Having nothing to say about
anyone but himself, the sociopath would bore us with his solipsism and
his inability to perceive that things portentous to himself may be trivial to
others. Putting aside one’s ego for the integrity of the work of art seems
to entail at least a minimum of virtue.
[15] Here is the full context of Weil’s comment: “If the beautiful is the real
presence of God in matter and if contact with the beautiful is a
sacrament in the full sense of the word, how is it that there are so many
perverted aesthetes? Nero. Is it like the hunger of those who frequent
black masses for the consecrated hosts? Or is it, more probably,
because these people do not devote themselves to what is genuinely
beautiful, but to a bad imitation? For, just as there is an art which is
divine, so there is one which is demoniacal. It was no doubt the latter
that Nero loved.” Weil: Gravity and Grace, trans. Crawford and Von de
Ruhr (New York: Routledge Classics, 2003), p. 192.
[16] Right-wing extremists, for instance, spend little time discussing
Céline’s fiction. Their preference is for atrocious knockoffs like The
Camp of the Saints and other works of no aesthetic significance. This,
we suspect, is because hero worship is a core value of the far right and
Céline’s protagonists are relentlessly anti-heroic in conception. One
might argue, for instance, that the true hero of Céline’s war trilogy is his
cat Bebert, who is no sort of Nazi but a creature innocently dedicated to
his own survival.
[17] This concern may seem to apply whether art is either continuous or
discontinuous with life. If the former, we risk being corrupted by immoral
art; if the latter, we risk becoming aloof from life by engaging with any art
at all. See Karen Hanson, “How Bad Can Good Art Be?” in Aesthetics
and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1998), pp. 204-226; ref. on 204-205.
